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Theoretical, computational, and experimental studies have converged to a model of
decision-making in which sensory evidence is stochastically integrated to a threshold,
implementing a shift from an analog to a discrete form of computation. Understanding
how this process can be chained and sequenced – as virtually all real-life tasks involve a
sequence of decisions – remains an open question in neuroscience. We reasoned that
incorporating a virtual continuum of possible behavioral outcomes in a simple decision
task – a fundamental ingredient of real-life decision-making – should result in a progressive
sequential approximation to the correct response. We used real-time tracking of motor
action in a decision task, as a measure of cognitive states reﬂecting an internal decision
process. We found that response trajectories were spontaneously segmented into a dis-
crete sequence of explorations separated by brief stops (about 200ms) – which remained
unconscious to the participants. The characteristics of these stops were indicative of a
decision process – a “moment of thought”: their duration correlated with the difﬁculty of
the decision and with the efﬁciency of the subsequent exploration. Our ﬁndings suggest
that simple navigation in an abstract space involves a discrete sequence of explorations
and stops and, moreover, that these stops reveal a ﬁngerprint of moments of thought.
Keywords: decision-making, mental algorithms, sequential operations, vision
INTRODUCTION
Even the simplest behavior involves a precisely coordinated
sequence of computations (Lashley, 1951). In certain controlled
experimental setups this sequence deﬁnes a ﬂow in which sensory
evidence is integrated to a criterion (a threshold) after which a
response is initiated (Vickers, 1970; Ratcliff, 1988; Shadlen and
Newsome, 2001; Usher and McClelland, 2001; Smith and Ratcliff,
2004;Ratcliff andMcKoon,2008).However, inmost real tasks,per-
ception and action are closely intertwined. Untangling the internal
processes of a task in non-transient, more “ethological,” experi-
mental setups is an important current challenge in neuroscience
(Gilbert and Sigman, 2007).
Different efforts have been made to parse complex action into
discrete computations. In well deﬁned sequential actions in which
the borders of internal computations are under experimental
control, markers of start- and end-process-encoders have been
identiﬁed (Fujii and Graybiel, 2003) mainly in prefrontal cortex
neurons. Experimental (Shallice, 1982; Ullman, 1984; Dehaene
and Changeux, 1997; Anderson and Lebiere, 1998) and theoret-
ical (Shallice, 1982; Dehaene and Changeux, 1997; Anderson and
Lebiere, 1998) efforts have also suggested sub-tasking in complex
problem solving as for instance in mental calculation and arith-
metic. It has been proposed that a sequential instance inwhich sto-
chastically accumulated evidence is thresholded may instrument a
shift from an analog to a discrete form of computation, crucial to
avoid error ampliﬁcation (Von Neumann, 1958; Good, 1979).
However, ﬁnding precise markers of the initiation and end-
ing of sub-processes is very difﬁcult in ethological experimental
setups. This poses a challenge for physiological experiments which
have to rely on blind methods (Michel et al., 1999; Hutchinson
et al., 2009) to identify sub-task structure. Under certain circum-
stances, however, complex motor actions can spontaneously be
parsed into discrete instances, thus providing an ideal tool to
understand the architecture of task sub-processes. For instance
drawing and handwriting have been shown to involve a serial
sequence of strokes, reﬂecting the existence of programs which
can concatenate modular motor schemes (Viviani and Terzuolo,
1982; Viviani and Cenzato, 1985; Viviani, 1986; Viviani and Flash,
1995; Meulenbroek et al., 1996; Manoel Ede et al., 2002). The pars-
ing points of this motor program can be predicted by geometric
properties, such as discontinuities or curvature maxima (Viviani
and Cenzato, 1985; Viviani and Flash, 1995).
Our aim was to design a decision-making experiment which
would spontaneously result in a cascade of operations with well
deﬁned behavioral markers. We reasoned that incorporating a
virtual continuum of possible behavioral outcomes – a fundamen-
tal ingredient of real-life decisions – instead of simply grouping
responses in a few categories should result in a progressive approx-
imation to the correct response. We hypothesized that under these
conditions, the response trajectories may spontaneously parse
themselves into a sequence of steps. Each step may reﬂect an
estimation of the target (the moment of thought) followed by a
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ballistic approximation to the target. The iteration of this process
may be thought as a progressive approximation, were the scale of
the problem shrinks after each discrete step. We thus designed a
variant of a shape recognition task in which subjects navigated in a
space of simple shapes, parametrically varying the local curvature
of the contours (Feldman and Singh, 2005), using real-time track-
ing of motor action in a decision task, as a measure of cognitive
states reﬂecting an internal decision process.
RESULTS
Participants had to complete a simple perceptual decision task.
They saw 1 of 10 abstract shapes in 1 of the 4 possible corners of
the display during a variable presentation time (between 50 and
800ms) followed by a mask, lasting 106ms (Figure 1A). Partici-
pants scrolled themouse to navigate in a one-dimensional periodic
space of shapes parameterized by a single parameter (ϕ) which
could vary between 0 and 2π (Figure 1B). When they moved the
mouse to the left (or right) ϕ increased (or decreased). The cor-
responding shape was displayed, frame by frame at 85Hz refresh
rate. Participants moved the mouse freely until they considered
that the shape matched the stimulus, and then clicked to indicate
the response (Figure 1A). As usually done in decision-making
experiments, participants were asked to respond as fast and accu-
rately as possible. During the response trajectory, we obtained a
continuous measure of accuracy throughout the trajectory.
D(t ) = ∣∣ϕtarget − ϕ(t )∣∣
The accuracy of the response is determined by the distance
between the responded object and the target:
D = ∣∣ϕtarget − ϕ(RT)∣∣
where RT indicates the response time, i.e., the time between the
presentation of the response screen and the mouse click. The dis-
tance ranges between 0 and π and, thus, chance performance is at
π/2.
Two participants completed eight sessions in consecutive days.
We ﬁrst performed a one-way ANOVA with presentation time as
the experimental factor and themeanperformance for each session
as repeated measures. Both subjects showed a signiﬁcant effect of
presentation time (Participant 1: F5, 35 = 24.2, p << 0.001; Partic-
ipant 2: F5, 35 = 57.89, p << 0.001). The ANOVA reﬂected a very
signiﬁcant increase in performance with presentation time, which
reached an asymptotic level about 200–300ms (Figure 1C). Even
thought an effect of learning was observed (data not shown), we
present here the behavior across all sessions, as we do not want
divert the attention from the main ﬁndings of the study.
As expected, the increase in performance was accompanied by
a decrease in the SD (Participant 1: F5, 35 = 26.31, p << 0.001;
Participant 2: F5, 35 = 27.81, p << 0.001), indicating that for
increasing presentation times all responses are progressively clus-
tered closer to the correct response. This can be seen explicitly
(Figure 1C) superposing all the responded shapes to a given tar-
get (in red) for different presentation times. This representation
further indicates that certain portions of the contour are more
susceptible to confusion (although a precise analysis should take
into account the restrictions of shape space) – in line with a
series of studies which have indicated that information along con-
tours is not homogeneous (Attneave, 1954; Barenholtz et al., 2003;
Feldman and Singh, 2005).
The previous results merely corroborate previous ﬁndings. We
showed that response accuracy saturates at about 300ms (Suzuki
and Cavanagh, 1998) and that errors are not uniformly distributed
along the contour (Driver and Baylis, 1996; Barenholtz and Feld-
man,2003;Barenholtz et al., 2003). Inwhat follows,we concentrate
on the main focus of this study: understanding the dynamics of
response trajectories. Our experimental setup – in which we mea-
sured participants’ progression to the response in real-time – was
speciﬁcally designed to address this question.
The smoothed raster plot of D(t ) – after sorting all trials by RT
showed a seemingly continuous pattern of convergence to the cor-
rect response (Figure 2A). However, when exploring single-trial
dynamics, we observed in virtually every single trial a sequence
of “stops,” i.e., instances in which the trajectory is frozen at a
ﬁxed point, and transitions (“walks”) between pairs of stops. This
pattern closely resembles the dynamics of ﬁxations and saccades
observed in eye-movements.
A representative trajectory for each participant can be seen in
Figure 2B (for videos of the reconstructed trajectory, see Videos
in Supplementary Material). These trajectories start with a stop.
This was expected since it constitutes a standard response initia-
tion time, i.e., the time it takes the participants to initiate motor
action and start moving the mouse toward the correct response.
The most surprising aspect is that after advancing toward the cor-
rect response, participants make several stops. Interviews with the
participants after all sessions had been completed revealed that
none of them were aware of making stops in the decision process
which is expected from their relatively short duration of about
200ms. Indeed in a real-time reconstruction of the trajectory,
the stops are not easily perceived (see Figure 2B and Videos in
Supplementary Material). We identiﬁed stops using a clustering
algorithm – very similar to those used for detecting ﬁxation points
in eye-movements (see Experimental Procedures for details). The
mean number of stops per trajectory was close to 3 (Participant
1: 3.81± 0.03; Participant 2: 2.79± 0.03) and their duration was
about 200ms (Participant 1: 250± 2ms; Participant 2: 166± 1ms;
Figure 2C). The number of stop was remarkably robust with over
65% of the trials having 2–4 stops.
This ﬁnding shows aubiquitous, spontaneous,andunconscious
segmentation of the convergence to the correct response in discrete
instances. Our hypothesis was that these stops constitute moments
of thought, i.e., instances in which subjects make an evaluation of
the current state and initiate a new decision. We thus explored
different predictions of this hypothesis, which relate the duration
of the stops, the distance to the target and presentation time.
First, the duration of each stop should increase with the dif-
ﬁculty of the decision (Holmes et al., 2005; Palmer et al., 2005).
In the ﬁrst stop difﬁculty should be determined mainly by the
duration of stimulus presentation. Second, if stops reﬂect a deci-
sion process, we should observe a distance effect which is virtually
observed in all one-dimensional comparisons (Moyer and Lan-
dauer, 1967); RTs should increase when the position of the stop is
closer to the target. Finally, as predicted by the classic speed accu-
racy trade-off (Wickelgren, 1977), for stops at comparable initial
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental design and performance in the task.
(A) Sketch of the experimental design. Subjects saw a shape for a variable
duration (between 50 and 800ms) at one of four possible positions,
followed by a 106-ms mask. After the mask subjects moved the mouse
from left and right to explore the shape space. They could move the mouse
freely until the observed shape matched the presented target. (B)The
periodic shape space, showing the 10 stimuli. (C) Performance (the
distance between the responded shape and the presented target)
increased with presentation time. Left panels: visual superposition of all
responded shapes for each target (only two shown, stimulus in red), Right
panels: performance increased with presentation time, reaching an
asymptote at around 300ms.
positions, the longer the duration of the stop onewould expect that
the subsequent walk (i.e., the position of the next stop) is closer
to the target. In what follows, we show experimental evidence
supporting these predictions (Figure 3).
We explored the ﬁrst hypothesis through a general-linear-
regressionmodel,with presentation time and distance to the target
as regressors. All results were consistent with the hypotheses and
are summarized in Table 1 and the average data is represented in
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FIGURE 2 | Discretization of a trajectory in a sequence of stops and
explorations. (A)The smoothed raster of all decision trajectories, sorted by
RT. The color code indicates the distance to the target. (B)The position of a
representative trajectory (the zero value of the y -axis corresponds to the
target). The trajectory reveals a series of stops (instances in which the
participant does not move the mouse) which were observed in all trajectories.
Sampling points with a distance greater than pi relates to the existence of a
complete turn in the trajectory. (C) Histograms of number of stops per
trajectory and stop duration. Stops were relatively fast (on average about
200ms) and were unnoticed to participants.
Figure 3A (regression to presentation time) and Figure 3B (cor-
relation with distance to the target). Both participants showed the
same dependencies: the ﬁrst stop was negatively correlated with
presentation time – the shorter presentations resulting in longer
stops. The variability of subsequent stops was mostly explained by
the distance to the target, also resulting in a signiﬁcant negative
correlation – the closer to the target, the longer the stop.
Next, we investigated the relationship between stop duration
and the accuracy of the subsequent exploration. That is,we consid-
ered the correlation between the duration of stop n and D(n + 1)
reasoning that longer stops shouldpredict ballistic approximations
which are closer to the target. Since D(n) and D(n + 1) are likely
correlated, it is important to separate the contribution of both
to the duration of stop n. Taking this into account, we measured
the regression between the duration of stop n and D(n + 1) for
different ﬁxed, small intervals of D(n) (Figure 3C). We observed
that for both participants there is an interval of D(n) – closer to
the target –, for which the duration at stop n was predictive of
D(n + 1): the longer the duration of the stop n, the closer the dis-
tance to the target at the stop n + 1 (inset Figure 3C and legend
for statistics).
DISCUSSION
We found that response trajectories in a decision task are spon-
taneously and unconsciously parsed into a discrete sequence that
manifests itself a series of stops. A detailed exploration of these
stops revealed that they constitute instance of decisions: their dura-
tion covaries as expected with the current status of task difﬁculty
and with the precision of the subsequent excursion. While these
properties constitute signatures of a decision process we cannot
rule out the existence of additional factors that could play a role
in the spontaneous parsing of the trajectory into a sequence of
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FIGURE 3 | Stops as a sequence of moments of thought. (A)The
duration of the ﬁrst stop (blue trace) decreased with stimulus presentation.
(B)The duration of the second and third stops decreased with the distance
of the shape at the stop to the target. (C) For a certain subset of D(n) close
to the target, the longer the duration of the stop, the shortest the distance
to the target of the exploration following the stop. The y -axis of the plot is
the slope of the linear regression between stop duration at D(n) vs.
D(n +1). Error bars represents the 95% conﬁdence interval. Additionally,
the inset shows an example of the negative correlation obtained in the
linear regression analysis (Participant 1: F 1, 2052 =6.03, p <0.05;
Participant 2: F 1, 696 =4.06, p <0.05). These results suggest that stops
constitute internal decisions since their duration correlated with the
difﬁculty of the decision in this instance and with the efﬁciency of the
subsequent exploration.
stops. A possibility could be that stops represent some perceptual
stage (i.e., stops as ﬁxed moments of stable perception) or even
a mixture of a perceptual component and a central (decisional)
one. One could envision a scenario where, similar to what hap-
pens during eye-movements, there is blurring of the input during
motion in the shape space. A perceptual component underlying
the stopswouldmanifest itself as a ﬁxed offset on the stop duration
distribution (Pashler, 1984; Sigman and Dehaene, 2005, 2008). We
have emphasized the central origin of the stops, linking them to
“thought” since they reﬂect ﬁngerprints of decision-making: stops
are longer when the problem is more difﬁcult (closer to the target)
and, the longer stops predict better outcomes. However, a similar
prediction might be expected for a purely sensory stage: longer
observation times are needed when the target is closer and they
would lead to better performance. However, even if stops reﬂected
an effective “ﬁxation,” i.e., freezing the image when motion is
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Table 1 | Correlation coefficients and statistics of stop duration (for the first, second, and third stops) with presentation time and distance to
target.
No. of stop Participant 1* Participant 2**
Presentation time Distance to target Presentation time Distance to target
1 −0.17 (t =9.74, p =6.5×10−22) −0.03 (t =1.26, p =0.21) −0.20 (t =8.04, p =2.8×10−15) −0.04 (t =1.20, p =0.23)
2 −0.003 (t =0.15, p =0.88) −0.19 (t =9.13, p =1.8×10−19) −0.05 (t =1.51, p =0.13) −0.07 (t =2.08, p =0.04)
3 0.02 (t =0.86, p =0.39) −0.07 (t =4.13, p =3.7×10−5) 0.04 (t =1.26, p =0.21) −0.06 (t =2.03, p =0.04)
*df=1823, **df=921. For even comparisons, only trajectories with at least three stops were considered for this analysis. Signiﬁcant correlations are marked in red
(p<0.05).
controlled with the hands and not with the eyes, which serves
to extract reliable sensory information, this sensory information
has to feed in turn a decision system (the action which has to be
taken in light of this new evidence; Kamienkowski et al., 2011).
The spontaneous parsing of a seemingly continuous stream is a
robust ﬁnding; elucidating the exact function of each stop cer-
tainly requires more investigation. Future studies should dissect
these ﬁne aspects of the nature of the stops, and the generaliza-
tion of these results to other tasks with varying perceptual, motor,
and cognitive loads as well as different sensory modalities. Sim-
ilarly, one could ask whether the stops are entangled with other
behavioral markers of cognitive processes such as eye-movements,
which could be required to evaluate the shape displayed during
stops. The analysis presented here shows the behavior collapsed
across sessions, and a trace of learning was observed during our
analysis (data not shown). In order to have a better understand-
ing of the processes behind the stops, it will be important to
analyze their contribution to the different stages in the learning
process.
Our ﬁndings can be viewed as a synthesis between discrete
approaches to human cognition (Anderson and Lebiere, 1998;
Zylberberg et al., 2011) and Fitts Law (Keele, 1968; Card et al.,
1983, 1986), a quantitative theory which successfully describes the
time to reach as target as a function of distance and accuracy
which can be derived assuming a sequence of increasingly accu-
rate movements until the target is reached. Our data support this
mechanistic explanation of the Fitts heuristic proposal, which has
received renewed attention with the pressure imposed to reﬁne the
ergonomy of human computer interactions.
Previous studies have used real-time tracking of motor action
as a handle to cognition, providing a window to observe otherwise
hidden cognitive states as they unfold in time (Spivey et al., 2005,
2009; Song and Nakayama, 2008). For instance it has been shown
that trajectories toward a target are often initiated toward a dis-
tracter and only corrected after a measurable latency. These curved
trajectories have served to measure objectively, the timing of inter-
nal decision processes (Spivey et al., 2005; Song and Nakayama,
2008). Compared to these previous studies, the trajectories in our
experiments involved longer explorations and time (in the order
of a second). The main novelty of this work is that this resulted
in a spontaneous segmentation of the trajectories into a discrete
sequence of explorations separated by stops. Such discretization
has been found in a variety of behaviors, when the temporal-scales
exceed the few 100ms, such as eye-movements analysis of single
trajectories, or perceptual rivalry between images (Murata et al.,
2003; Mamassian and Goutcher, 2005). Also, although not mea-
sured precisely, indirect markers of spontaneous sub-tasking have
been reported in other domains of cognition, as for instance in
arithmetic or more generally complex problem solving (Shallice,
1982; Ullman, 1984; Dehaene and Changeux, 1997; Anderson and
Lebiere, 1998; Zylberberg et al., 2011). Finally drawing and hand-
writing (and more generally complex motor actions) have been
shown to involve a serial sequence of strokes, reﬂecting the exis-
tence of programs which can concatenate modular motor schemes
(Viviani and Terzuolo, 1982; Viviani and Cenzato, 1985; Viviani,
1986; Viviani and Flash, 1995; Meulenbroek et al., 1996; Manoel
Ede et al., 2002).
Here we extend these ﬁndings to the decision-making process,
showing that it can be segmented into a sequence of instances
of exploration and stabilization. Our ﬁnding that even simple
navigation in an abstract space involves a discrete sequence of
explorations and stops and, moreover, that these stops reveal a
ﬁngerprint of moments of thoughts suggests that such architec-
ture may be ubiquitous and part of a fundamental organization
of cognition. Such dynamics has been postulated by different
theoretical and computation models, which suggest that cogni-
tion involves the transition between transiently stable microstates
(Michel et al., 1999; Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2005; Ito et al.,
2007; Rabinovich et al., 2008; Schyns et al., 2009).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
STIMULI
Participants performed a shape identiﬁcation task. Shapes were
white on black contours belonging to an abstract one-dimensional
shape space. To generate a periodical one-dimensional continuum
of shapes we used the following method.
First we deﬁned a two-dimensional space of shapes in polar
coordinates, for each pair (a, b) in the plane, we associated the
contour r(θ) corresponding to:
r = a
(b − 0.7) ·
{
cos
(
θ+ 1.5 · π · sin(θ)2 · b
3.2
)}
+ 2
In turn, a and b are deﬁned by a phase (ϕ) sampling the
two-dimensional space through an ellipse, according to:
a = 0.65 · cos(ϕ) + 1.35
b = 2 · sin(ϕ) + 4
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There is of course nothing particularly special about this set
of parameters which were chosen by inspection to assure that
the shapes would have “intermediate complexity.” The space of
shapes is brieﬂy sketched in Figure 1B, and in the Videos in
Supplementary Material, an evolution of shapes as ϕ varies is
shown.
Thus, the previous equations establish the correspondence of a
contour for each ϕ∈ [0,2π]. Within this space we chose 10 values
of ϕ as the 10 distinct possible targets.
PERCEPTUAL CALIBRATION OF THE PERIODIC SPACE OF FORMS
Since the metrics in ϕ has no correspondence with the percep-
tual metrics in shape space, we calibrated this space in a previous
control experiment. We ﬁrst sampled the interval [0,2π] at 10
equidistant points [0 : 2π10 , 4π10 , . . . , 18π10 ]. Three participants per-
formed this calibration experiment. The 10 different shapes were
presented randomly for 106ms (total of 900 trials) and subjects
responded freely moving the mouse (a movement of the mouse
corresponded to a movement in ϕ). We then measured the SD
in the response for each value of ϕ˜. If the space was sampled in
a perceptually uniform way, the SD would be the same across all
shapes. We thus rescaled to a new unit given by:
ϕ˜(ϕ) =
ϕ∫
0
α(ϕ′)dϕ′
where α(ϕ) is the inverse of the SD for the different shapes inter-
polated to the whole space using cubic splines. In this new unit, by
deﬁnition, the SD is uniform across all stimuli. In the experiments
reported here the shape space was sampled uniformly in this new
variable.
PROCEDURE
Participants seated in a comfortable chair at a distance of 60 cm
from a 19′ computer screen (refresh rate of 85Hz, resolution
of 1152× 864 pixels). Behavioral experiments were programmed
in Matlab (v 7.5) using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Each trial begun with a ﬁxation cross,
which lasted 401ms. Following the ﬁxation cross the target (1 of
10 arbitrary different shapes selected a priori) was presented for
a variable duration (randomly chosen across trials) of 59, 106,
201, 354, 507, and 802ms. The shape was presented at one of four
possible positions (up-left, up-right, down-left, and down-right
corners, with an eccentricity of 12.5˚) and was followed by a 106-
ms mask. The mask was a rectangular white noise image covering
the area deﬁned by the stimuli. The size of the stimulus was 8˚. The
set of stimuli presented was held constant through the experiment
(see Figure 1B).
Following the mask, subjects saw a shape, randomly sampled
from the periodic space (excluding awindow centered on the stim-
ulus with a half-size of 20% of diameter of the circular space)
which was displayed at the center of the screen. The response
shapes were larger than the stimuli, of a size of 14˚.
Participants then could move freely the mouse, and the x-
position of the mouse was mapped to a phase (with an equivalence
of approximately 0.7 cm/rad). Thus, moving the mouse to the left
and to the right, subjects could explore the shape space until they
found the shape that had been presented. Mouse location was
recorded at a sample rate of 85Hz. Subjects were asked to indicate
the chosen shape by clicking the mouse button when they thought
the seen shaped matched the presented target. Two naïve partici-
pants (one 25-years-old male, and one 20-years-old female, both
students of the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina) completed
eight sessions of 480 trials in successive days. Each session lasted
about 30min.
DATA ANALYSIS
In this paper we grouped all sessions for analysis. We did observe a
trace of learning in this task, however we did not want this to dis-
tract from the main focus of this paper, which was the exploration
of the dynamics of response trajectories. The effect of learning will
be reported elsewhere. All the properties of stops reported in this
article were conserved throughout the course of learning.
To give a general overview of thewhole ensemble of trajectories,
we sorted the trajectories by RT and smoothed them in the x-axis
(Time) and y-axis (Trials), using a window size of 10 sampling
points or trials, respectively.
Stops were calculated setting a threshold criterion to the
velocity of mouse movement. Velocity measurements were ﬁrst
smoothed by local averaging with four neighbor points. We
set an arbitrary threshold of 0.001 rad/sample (0.085 rad/s),
small when compared to typical values for velocity (Participant
1: mean= 0.05 rad/sample, SD= 0.03 rad/sample; Participant 2:
mean= 0.07 rad/sample, SD= 0.05 rad/sample). We exclude for
analysis stops shorter than three sampling points and longer than
eight times the SD of the distribution. We ruled out the possibility
of the stops being caused by a lifting of the mouse from the table in
control sessions where videos of the mouse motion were recorded.
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Video S1 | Periodic space of shapes.
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